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Legal 
Lore 
Sin, Scandal, and 
Substantive Due Process 
by Wendy Collins Perdue 
For students of civil procedure, the 
names Pennoyer and Neff evoke these 
dry facts: In an initial suit, one J.H. 
Mitchell sued Neff in Oregon state 
court. Because Neff could not be found 
within Oregon, he was served by pub-
lication. Neff never appeared, and a 
default judgment was entered against 
him. To satisfy the judgment, Mitchell 
attached Neff's Oregon real estate. The 
property was sold at auction, and 
Pennoyer later acquired it. Nearly a 
decade later, Neff returned to Oregon 
and brought suit in federal court to 
evict Pennoyer from the land, claiming 
that the original judgment was invalid. 
The Supreme Court found for Neff in 
an opinion that has become a corner-
stone of personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
Those familiar facts do not begin to 
tell the full story, which begins with a 
young man, Marcus Neff, heading 
across the country by covered wagon 
train, presumably to seek his fortune. 
Neff left Iowa in early 1848 at the age 
of 24, joining a wagon train of five 
companies of wagons. At that time, the 
question of Oregon statehood was 
being considered in Congress, and 
there was much speculation that large 
tracts of the vast, undeveloped land of 
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Oregon would be made available to 
homesteaders. The speculation proved 
to be correct, and Marcus Neff was one 
of the earliest settlers to claim land 
under the Oregon Donation Act. 
To qualify for land under the 
Donation Act, one had to be a citizen 
living in Oregon and submit a request 
for land by December 1, 1850. Inter-
estingly, Neff's land request was 
originally dated December 15, 1850, 
which would have made it too late, 
but "December" was crossed out and 
"September" written in. This is the 
first of many instances suggesting that 
events surrounding Pennoyer v. Neff 
may have been tainted by fraud and 
deception. 
Not surprisingly, registration of a 
Donation Act claim required a certain 
amount of paperwork. In addition to 
the initial claim, the homesteader was 
required after four years to submit the 
affidavits of two disinterested people 
affirming that the homesteader had cul-
tivated the land for his own use. Neff 
secured two affidavits, which were 
submitted prematurely in 1853 and 
resubmitted in 1856. The 1856 submis-
sion should have entitled Neff to 
receive a patent to the land, but the 
government was notoriously slow in 
processing claims, and 10 years passed 
before Neff received his land patent. 
Early in 1862, Neff made the unfor-
tunate decision to consult a local 
Portland attorney, J.H. Mitchell. 
Establishing the facts about events in 
which Mitchell was involved is partic-
ularly difficult because, as one research 
librarian commented, "Mitchell was 
the kind of person who ended his cor-
respondence with 'Bum this letter after 
reading."' Although the nature of the 
legal services is unclear, Neff may have 
consulted Mitchell in an attempt to 
expedite the paperwork concerning his 
land patent. Neff was illiterate, and at 
the time he consulted Mitchell, the gov-
ernment had still not issued his patent. 
Mitchell, moreover, specialized in land 
matters. In mid-1862, several months 
after Neff first consulted Mitchell, 
another affidavit was filed on Neff's 
behalf. Several months thereafter, Neff 
received a document from the govern-
ment certifying that he had met the cri-
teria for issuance of a patent. 
Whatever Neff's reasons for seeking 
Mitchell's legal services, he certainly 
could have done better in his choice of 
lawyers. "J.H. Mitchell" was actually 
the Oregon alias of one John Hipple. 
Hipple had been a teacher in Penn-
sylvania, who, after being forced to 
marry the 15-year-old student whom he 
had seduced, left teaching and took up 
law. He practiced with a partner for 
several years but apparently concluded 
that it was time to move on to greener 
pastures. Thus, in 1860 Hipple headed 
west, taking with him $4,000 of client 
money and his then-current paramour, 
a local school teacher. They made their 
way to California, where Hipple aban-
doned the teacher, ostensibly because 
she was sick and her medical expenses 
had become too burdensome, and 
moved on to Portland, Oregon. There, 
using the name John H. Mitchell, he 
quickly established himself as a suc-
cessful lawyer, specializing in land liti-
gation and railroad right-of-way cases. 
He also remarried without bothering 
to divorce his first wife. As one his-
torian has observed, Mitchell's success 
as a lawyer cannot be attributed to 
either intellectual or oratorical skills; 
rather, his strengths included excep-
tional political instincts, a generous 
disposition, and a friendly handshake. 
What he lacked in ethics and ability, he 
made up for with persistence and a 
desire for success. In his subsequent 
political career, he became known as a 
man whose "political ethics justified 
any means that would win the battle." 
Mitchell was first elected to the state 
senate in 1862, became president of the 
state senate in 1864, was seven times a 
candidate for the U.S. Senate, and was 
elected in four of those contests. 
Mitchell's ethical standards as a 
lawyer were no higher than his ethics 
as a politician. As the Oregonian 
observed in 1882: "His political meth-
ods are indeed pitched on a sufficiently 
low scale but not below his methods as 
a lawyer." Given Mitchell's reputation, 
one might at least question whether 
Neff in fact owed the money Mitchell 
claimed was due. Neff paid Mitchell 
$6.50, but Mitchell claimed he was 
owed an additional $209. Although 
Mitchell's services were rendered 
between early 1862 and mid-1863, 
Mitchell waited several years to take 
legal action against Neff, perhaps pur-
posely waiting until Neff left the state. 
On November 3, 1865, Mitchell filed 
suit against Neff in Oregon state court, 
seeking $253.14 plus costs. Mitchell 
secured jurisdiction under ·Oregon 
statute § 55, which provided that after 
due diligence, if the defendant cannot 
be found within the state, he may be 
served by publication. Mitchell sup-
plied an affidavit in which he asserted 
that Neff was living somewhere in 
California and could not be found. 
Mitchell provided no details as to what 
he had done to locate Neff, and given 
Mitchell's lack of scruples, one might 
wonder whether Neff's whereabouts 
were indeed unknown to Mitchell and 
whether he had made any attempt to 
locate Neff. Notice of the lawsuit was 
published for six weeks in the Pacific 
Christian Advocate, a weekly newspa-
per published under the authority of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church and 
devoted primarily to religious news and 
inspirational articles. 
In initiating the litigation, Mitchell 
made what ultimately proved to be a 
crucial mistake. Mitchell's affidavit 
asserted that Neff owned property, but 
he did not attach the property at that 
time. Mitchell most likely neglected 
this step because Oregon law did not 
appear to require attachment as a pre-
requisite for reliance on § 55. 
A default in judgment in the amount 
of $294.98 was entered against Neff on 
February 19, 1866. Although Mitchell 
had an immediate right to execute on 
the judgment, he waited until early July 
of 1866 to seek a writ of execution, 
possibly waiting for the arrival of 
Neff's land patent. The title, which was 
sent from Washington, D.C., on March 
22, 1866, would have taken several 
months to arrive in Oregon and thus 
probably arrived in Oregon shortly 
before Mitchell sought the writ of exe-
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cution. Interestingly, although Mitchell 
had alleged that Neff could not be 
found, the Oregon land office appar-
ently had no difficulty delivering the 
patent to Neff. 
Under Oregon law, to secure execu-
tion, one had to obtain a writ of execu-
tion and post and publish notice for 
four weeks. All the steps were appar-
ently taken. On August 7, 1866, the 
property was sold at a sheriff's auction 
for $341.60. Notably, the buyer was not 
Sylvester Pennoyer, as the Supreme 
Court opinion and commentators have 
implied. The property was purchased 
by none other than J.H. Mitchell, who 
three days later assigned the property 
to Sylvester Pennoyer. 
Pennoyer had much in common with 
Mitchell. He, like Mitchell, was a 
Portland lawyer, involved in politics 
(Mitchell was a Republican; Pennoyer 
was a Democrat) and active in real 
estate speculation. There is no evidence 
available on whether Pennoyer had 
actual knowledge of or connection to 
the original action, though it is certainly 
possible. Moreover, because he took 
title through Mitchell, it is not clear that 
he should have been treated as a true 
innocent third-party purchaser. 
It appears that for the next eight 
years, Pennoyer peacefully minded his 
own business, doing those things one 
would expect of any property owner: 
He paid taxes, cut some timber, and 
sold a small portion of the land. The 
peace was broken in 1874 when Neff 
reappeared on the scene. 
The evidence suggests that Neff 
began making trouble for Pennoyer 
several months before he actually filed 
suit, because in July of 1874, Pennoyer 
began taking steps to protect the valid-
ity of his title. It seems that when the 
property was originally sold at the sher-
iff's auction, local officials had been 
somewhat lax in the matter of title. The 
sheriff's deed was not signed until five 
months after the sale, and then it was 
signed by the deputy sheriff, not the 
sheriff. In an apparent effort to ensure 
that this carelessness was not the basis 
for an attack on his title, Pennoyer 
obtained the signature of the then-
current sheriff on a second deed dated 
July 21, 1874. Not taking any chances, 
three days later he acquired still a third 
deed, this one signed by the man who 
had been sheriff at the time of the sale. 
But all the precautions were for naught; 
ultimately, Pennoyer was evicted. 
(please turn to page 56) 
If you are fortunate enough to have 
the prosecution hand you an issue 
involving questionable prosecutorial 
conduct, play it to the jury. Particularly 
when an unethical practice will not 
result in reversible error but can be 
exposed at trial, you can wreak havoc 
with the prosecution's case. 
Prosecutors have historically used 
the media to further political agendas 
or to respond to public outcries for 
action. There are situations in which 
putting the prosecution on trial in the 
media may be in your client's best 
interest. At the very least, a defense 
lawyer can throw a prosecutor off-
balance by focusing on the pros-
ecution's conduct rather than the 
defendant's. 
Whether an issue involves with-
holding of key exculpatory evidence 
or distorting or manipulating witness 
testimony, prosecutors are exceedingly 
uncomfortable when their conduct 
finds its way into the substantive 
aspects of the case. The prosecutor's 
self-image as the good guy wearing 
the white hat may be punctured. The 
prosecutor may do some rethinking, 
particularly if the media has now put 
the prosecution's conduct under a 
microscope. 
In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis urged 
that the courts should ensure that gov-
ernmental overreaching be firmly dealt 
with: 
Decency, security, and liberty alike 
demand that government officials 
shall be subjected to the same rules 
of conduct that are commands to 
the citizen. In a government of 
laws, existence of the government 
will be imperiled if it fails to 
observe the law scrupulously. Our 
government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher. For good or 
for ill, it teaches the whole people 
by its example. Crime is conta-
gious. If the government becomes 
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy. To declare that in 
the administration of the criminal 
law the end justifies the means-
to declare that the government 
may commit crimes in order to 
secure the conviction of a private 
criminal-would bring terrible 
retribution. Against that perni-
cious doctrine this court should 
resolutely set its face. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575 (1928). 
The prosecutor wields awesome 
power in our system of justice. Only 
the combined willingness of the courts, 
defense lawyers, and prosecutors to 
vigorously challenge prosecutorial 
misconduct can prevent abuse of that 
power. ~ 
Legal 
Lore 
(continued from page 42) 
The case of Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. 
Cas. at 1280, was filed in federal court 
on September 10, 1874, before Judge 
Matthew Deady. There is no question 
that by the time of Neff v. Pennoyer, 
Deady knew of Mitchell's lack of 
scruples. Deady was not only a distin-
guished jurist and long-time resident of 
Oregon, he was also an acute observer 
of life and politics in Oregon. He kept 
extensive diaries in which he referred 
to the events and prominent people of 
the day. By the time Neff v. Pennoyer 
arose, Mitchell's prior activities in 
Pennsylvania and his bigamous mar-
riage had received wide public atten-
tion in Oregon, and Deady had closely 
followed the scandal. 
By June of 1873, Deady thought all 
the scandals would be the end of 
Mitchell. As he explained: "I think he 
[Mitchell] must go down. Seduction, 
desertion, theft, clandestine change of 
name and absconding and bigamy are 
too much for a man to carry in the 
Senate, though he is making a 
desparate [sic] fight of it." Mitchell 
nonetheless survived and even flour-
ished. As time went by, Deady's diary 
entries displayed an increasing con-
tempt for the man. After 1873, Deady 
generally referred to Mitchell by his 
born name, Hipple. On election day in 
1876, Deady stated in disgust: "Have 
not voted for Congressman since the 
Republicans put Hipple in the platform 
in 1873 and don't think I will until they 
take him out . . ." 
Deady also had further reason to 
doubt Mitchell's integrity. In 1873, 
allegations of bribery by Mitchell and 
others surfaced in connection with a 
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Senate election. Deady recorded in his 
diary that Ben Holliday, a political ally 
of Mitchell's, had reportedly spent 
$20,000 in bribes to buy the votes 
necessary to ensure Mitchell's election. 
Deady, along with the U.S. attorney in 
Oregon, pushed for a prompt and 
thorough investigation of the matter. 
When one grand jury refused to return 
an indictment, Deady ordered a new 
grand jury. 
It looked as if indictments might be 
returned until Mitchell managed to use 
further bribery to bring the investiga-
tion to a halt. The attorney general at 
that time, George H. Williams, also 
from Oregon, had recently been nomi-
nated to the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
his confirmation was in doubt. Senator 
Mitchell approached Williams and 
offered to vote for confirmation if, in 
exchange, Williams would halt the 
grand jury. Williams agreed and 
ordered the Oregon U.S. attorney to 
drop the matter. When he refused, 
Williams fired him. Commenting on 
this incident, Deady called the removal 
of the U.S. attorney "[a]n atrocious act 
for which W[illiams] & M[itchell] 
deserve severe punishment." 
Neff apparently had prospered in 
California. He had settled in San 
Joaquin with a wife and family as well 
as servants, property, and livestock. He 
was prepared, however, to leave his 
home in California and move himself, 
his wife, and his daughter to Oregon 
for a year to pursue his various legal 
actions. 
The opening salvo between Neff and 
Pennoyer was fired when Neff sued to 
evict Pennoyer, but the war did not end 
there. After Pennoyer lost the eviction 
suit and costs were awarded against 
him, he battled bitterly over the amount 
of those costs. Neff was again the win-
ner, and adding insult to injury, he pro-
ceeded to sue Pennoyer again-this 
time to recover money damages sus-
tained as a result of Pennoyer's cutting 
down timber on the property. Pennoyer 
counterclaimed to collect property 
taxes that he had paid from 1866 to 
1875. The counterclaim was dismissed, 
and Pennoyer's defense of the damage 
action proved to be the closest he got to 
a victory: The jury found for Neff but 
awarded only nominal damages. 
When the dust had settled, Pennoyer, 
who the Supreme Court assumed was a 
bona fide purchaser for value, was left 
holding the bag. Pennoyer had pur-
chased the land for "valuable consider-
ation" and paid the taxes on it for a 
number of years, yet he found himself 
evicted, with nothing to show for his 
money and subject to suit for trespass 
for entering the land he thought he 
owned. There is no evidence that 
Pennoyer did or could ever recover the 
loss from anyone. 
Following the litigation, Neff disap-
peared into obscurity; not so Pennoyer 
and Mitchell. Pennoyer went on to be 
governor of Oregon for two terms, fol-
lowed by one term as mayor of 
Portland, but he remained bitter about 
his defeat in Pennoyer v. Neff. Ten 
years after the Supreme Court decision, 
in his inaugural address as governor, 
Pennoyer decried that decision as a 
usurpation of state power. He remained 
a vociferous critic of the Supreme 
Court, urging at one point that the 
entire Court should be impeached, 
explaining: 
We have during this time been liv-
ing under a government not based 
upon the Federal Constitution, but 
under one created by the plausible 
sophistries of John Marshall .... 
Our constitutional government has 
been supplanted by a judicial 
oligarchy. 
Mitchell also remained in the public 
eye. He was elected to the U.S. Senate 
in 1872, lost his senate seat in 1879, but 
was reelected in 1885. By modem stan-
dards, Mitchell's reelection is quite 
extraordinary. Shortly before the 1885 
election, Judge Deady, the lower court 
judge in Pennoyer v. Neff, came into 
possession of a set of love letters that 
Mitchell had written to Mitchell's sec-
ond wife's younger sister during the 
five years he carried on an affair with 
her. Deady turned over the love letters 
to a newspaper, the Oregonian, an 
outspoken critic of Mitchell. The 
Oregonian willingly published the let-
ters for all to read and enjoy. Despite 
the scandal, Mitchell was elected four 
days later, something that Deady called 
"a disgrace to the state and a reproach 
to humanity." 
Scandal was a way of life for 
Mitchell. In 1905, he, along with a 
number of other prominent Oregon 
officials, was indicted in connection 
with a massive land fraud scheme. The 
scheme was a simple one. After pass-
ing the Donation Act, Congress had 
passed the Homestead Act of 1862 and 
the Timber and Stone Act of 1878. All 
of them offered small tracts of land to 
individual settlers. Aspiring lumber 
barons trying to assemble large tracts 
of land transported huge numbers of 
settlers to land offices to file dummy 
applications. With a few well-placed 
bribes, the applications would be ap-
proved, and the settlers would then 
transfer their deeds to Mitchell and oth-
ers in exchange for a modest payoff. 
In July of 1905, while still serving in 
the U.S. Senate, Mitchell was convicted 
and sentenced to six months in jail, a 
$1,000 fine, and complete disbarment 
from public office. In December of that 
same year, while his appeal was pend-
ing, Mitchell died, apparently from 
complications following a tooth extrac-
tion. The Daily Oregon Statesman 
reported that the Senate adjourned 
without any official recogmt10n of 
Mitchell's death, though the chaplain 
"recalled the situation to mind in his 
prayer by referring pointedly to corrup-
tion and death and by praying that the 
members of the Senate might be given 
strength to bear each other's burdens." 
Possibly moved by the chaplain's 
prayer, the Senate later passed a resolu-
tion to pay Mitchell's funeral expenses. 
The fraudulent scheme is interesting 
not only because it was the last and 
among the most public of the scandals 
that had become a way of life for 
Mitchell but also because the nature of 
the scheme itself raises a nagging, 
though unanswerable, question: Were 
the initial transactions between Neff 
and Mitchell part of an aborted fraudu-
lent arrangement? One can only 
wonder. l!:;l 
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Creative 
Defenses 
(continued from page 25) 
reports, but you will hear about it at 
trial. There are two possible responses. 
One is the classic cross-examination, 
designed to demonstrate the impor-
tance of thoroughness and accuracy in 
report writing. In essence, you argue to 
the jury that if it is not in the reports, it 
did not happen. The other approach is 
to incorporate the new fact into the 
defense. Your expert can help do this. 
The new fact in my case was that my 
client was totally calm after being strip-
searched. She was not crying; she did 
not appear frightened; she was not hys-
terical. As you might expect, my expert 
helped fit this fact into my theory. Of 
course she was calm, my expert testi-
fied: She was finally safe. She had 
finally escaped her tormentor. She had 
found sanctuary. My closing argument 
began to take its final shape as my expert 
testified: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is 
that consistent with a sophisticated 
heroin smuggler? They are calm at 
the border and then panic when 
arrested. My client's reaction was 
just the opposite. 
By using the new fact to my advan-
tage, I had actually strengthened the 
defense case. 
My experience is that jurors are truly 
undecided at the close of proof in syn-
drome cases. They go back and forth in 
their minds. It is difficult for them. The 
defendant is an admitted heroin smug-
gler, an admitted cocaine distributor, or 
an admitted methamphetamine manu-
facturer, and the jurors are being asked 
to set the defendant free. Under the cir-
cumstances, you will be under more pres-
sure than usual to sum up effectively. 
Make your closing argument as dra-
matic and powerful as possible. For 
example, by the time your summation 
is finished in a posttraumatic stress 
case, the jurors should be in the fox-
holes, in the mud with your client, 
watching their best friends dying 
around them. They should be able to 
hear the bombs exploding overhead. 
They should be uncomfortable and 
